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Abstract
Regional inequality in China appears to be persistent and even growing in the past two
decades. We study potential osetting factors and interprovincial migration to shed light on
the sources of this persistence. We nd that some of the inequality could be attributed to
dierences in quality of labor, industry composition, and geographical location of provinces. We
also demonstrate that interprovincial migration, while driven in part by wage dierences across
provinces, does not oset these dierences. Finally, we nd that interprovincial redistribution
did not help oset regional inequality during our sample period.
JEL classi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11 Introduction
Persistent inequalities across regions are a feature of many developed and developing nations. This
fact conicts with standard neoclassical theory, which suggests that in a well-functioning economy
regional inequalities should be eliminated through factor mobility, trade, or arbitrage. Although a
signicant research literature has been devoted to resolving the conict between theory and fact,
no real consensus has been formed (Magrini, 2007). In this paper, we analyze the patterns and
causes of persistent regional inequality in China. Our ndings contribute to the ongoing debate.
China presents a unique and important opportunity to study regional inequality. In terms of
income, China is a very unequal country.1 According to World Bank estimates, China's income
Gini coecient far exceeds that of South Asian countries such as India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.
Income dierences in China are large, both inter- and intraregionally, with interregional dierences
increasing over time (Fujita and Hu, 2001; Kanbur and Zhang, 1999). China is also a country in
transition, altering its institutions and economy at a rapid pace but with considerable variation
across provinces.2 Moreover, the long history of regional separateness in China means that data
collection eorts are as complete for China's provinces as they are for the country as a whole.
Together these characteristics make China an ideal case study for examining the various hypotheses
regarding persistent regional inequalities.
Hypotheses about regional inequalities fall into two broad categories. The rst relates persistent
inequalities to market imperfections associated with institutional or informational barriers that
limit factor mobility, trade, or both (Magrini, 2007; Cremer and Pestieau, 2007).3 Empirical work
provides evidence for these types of barriers. For example, the cross-country research shows that
persistent regional disparities can be linked to institutional barriers such as quotas on ows of
human and physical capital, taris, and insucient property rights. Studies within countries, where
institutional barriers are less pronounced, nd informational barriers to be important, especially
those relating to the ow of labor across areas (Bound and Holzer, 2000). Again, China oers a
1Persistent and even growing cross-regional inequality in China during the reform period has been documented in
the past (Jian, Sachs, and Warner, 1996).
2For a survey of regional inequalities in transition economies, see Huber (2006).
3Traditionally macro- and microeconomic approaches to this literature have focused on growth rates and levels,
respectively. We focus on levels in this paper. For a review of the literature on growth rates see Magrini (2007).
2unique opportunity to study institutional barriers to labor migration because of a gradual removal
of the system of permanent registration (hukou) during the time period we consider.
The second category of hypothesis on the causes of regional inequalities argues that persistent
inequalities in income are not about constraints but are rather the result of unmeasured osetting
factors that work to equalize well-being across regional agents (Rice and Venables, 2003). Empirical
work on this hypothesis has investigated dierences in government tax and transfer programs,
cost-of-living dierences, and dierences in amenities, but has not reached consensus (Rice and
Venables, 2003).
In our sample we nd, not surprisingly, that cost-of-living dierences are, indeed, an important
osetting factor. Thus, we adjust average nominal wages in each province by a province-specic
consumer price index (CPI) to obtain average real wages, which we use to study other osetting
factors. We consider measures of education levels in each province (to proxy for the quality of labor),
industrial composition in each province, its geographical location, and cross-province government
transfers. We take these factors one at a time and nd that, with the exception of government
transfers, they all help explain a substantial portion of wage dierentials. These factors cannot all
be considered together, because of the high correlation between the variables we consider in our
sample. In the best case, about half of the variance in real wages across provinces remains after
controlling for these osetting factors.
There is a large body of research focused on inequality in China. For instance, Whalley and
Zhang (2004) calibrate the eect of removal of the hukou system and show that its contribution
to regional as well as urban{rural inequality is sizable. Kanbur and Zhang (2005) construct a
long time series of regional inequality and show that it is explained, in dierent periods of time,
by the shares of heavy industry, the degree of decentralization, and the degree of openness. In
a recent paper, Wan, Lu, and Chen (2007) show that increasing globalization, uneven domestic
capital accumulation, and privatization contribute to regional inequality in China, while the eects
of location, urbanization, and the dependency ratio have been declining. Yao and Zhang (2001)
demonstrate that there is divergence among groups (or clubs) of Chinese provinces in terms of
real per capita GDP. Meng, Gregory, and Want (2005) argue that discontinued provision of free
3education, housing, and medical care as well as growing uncertainty increased the incidence of
urban poverty when measured in terms of expenditure.
We nd that cross-province migration to urban areas is driven, at least in part, by wage dieren-
tials; however, contrary to ndings by Whalley and Zhang (2004), migration does not reduce wage
inequality across provinces. We believe this is because between 1995 and 2000, a period for which
we study migration, there were still restrictions on labor mobility that precluded labor ows from
having any noticeable eect in terms of equalizing wages across provinces.
Our results indicate that regional inequality is likely to persist in China for quite some time,
since it is due to such structural and long-term factors as education, industry composition, and
geographical location. While further removing barriers to labor mobility may alleviate some of
the regional wage dierences, it is likely to be a slow process, because it needs to be accompanied
by urban development. In the meantime, cross-province income redistribution may be useful to
address social and economic tensions that regional inequality can bring. Our study nds that, in
the period we consider, interprovince transfers did not help oset regional wage dierences.
The paper is organized as follows: We begin by describing the policies that restrict labor move-
ment in China in Section 2. We describe our data and recent trends in Section 3. In Section 4 we
present the results of our empirical analysis. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Migration policy in modern China
In 1958, Mao Zedong set up a hereditary residency permit system, known as hukou, dening where
people could work. This system classied individuals as either \rural" or \urban" workers and
assigned them to a specic geographic area. Under this system, one cannot acquire a legal perma-
nent residence nor the numerous community{based rights, opportunities, benets, and privileges in
places other than where his hukou is. Only through proper authorization from the government can
one permanently change his hukou location. For longer than a one-month stay and especially when
seeking local employment, one must apply and be approved for a temporary residential permit.
Violators are subject to nes, detention, and forced repatriation, which was partially relaxed in
42003.4
In addition to limiting the rural-to-urban migration of the workers, which explains an extraordi-
narily low degree of urbanization in China, this system limited migration across regions: migrants
needed to obtain registration in the new area before they were allowed to work legally. Because of
bureaucracy and red tape, obtaining registration could take months or years. Hence, the migration
process in China was in many ways similar to the migration process across national borders.
Until 1978, the system was enforced rather strictly: police would periodically round up those
without valid residence permits, place them in detention centers, and expel them from cities. After
Chinese market reforms began 1978, a private sector appeared. Unlike state-owned enterprizes,
private rms frequently do not require registration from potential employees. Economic reforms
created pressures to encourage migration from the interior to the coast and provided incentives for
ocials not to enforce regulations on migration. However, even if migrants are hired without the
registration, they do not have access to social services such as child care, schools, or health care.
Forced repatriation rules were still in place after the beginning of market reforms. In fact, the 1982
\Measures of Detaining and Repatriating Floating and Begging People in the Cities" streamlined
the relevant legislation. It was not until 2003, after the tragic incident in Guangzhou, where a Hubei
resident was beaten to death in jail in the process of repatriation, and the outcry that followed,
that the repatriation law was relaxed. \Measures on Managing and Assisting Urban Homeless
Beggars without Income" adopted on June 20, 2003, established new rules governing the handling
and assisting of destitute migrants. Many cities, including the most controlled Beijing municipality,
decided soon after that migrants outside their hukou must be dealt with more carefully; they are
no longer automatically subject to detention, nes, or forced repatriation, unless they have become
homeless, paupers, or criminals.
While recent reforms made it easier for migrants to survive without a hukou, they did not
make it easier to obtain one. Thus, many people, especially those with families, are hesitant to
permanently change their location. Moreover, fees charged for temporary residency permits, while
fairly aordable, add to the cost of moving. Nevertheless, according to the census data, in 2000
4This information and some of what follows is taken in part from Wang (2005).
5almost 30 percent of the population was residing in a province other than the one in which they
had their hukou.
There has been more progress in reforming the hukou system at the provincial level than at the
national level. Between 2001 and 2007 a number of provinces adopted various measures, mostly
addressing the rural{urban migration limitations. These measures ranged from changing the ad-
ministration of the hukou system to completely abolishing the dierences between rural and urban
hukou.5
For the purpose of our project, we have to recognize that the barriers to cross-province migration
in China still exist but weakened throughout our sample period. Moreover, we have to take into
account the fact that the progress of reform was uneven across provinces.
3 Data
In this section, we describe our data sources for inequality, osetting factors, and migration. We
also describe recent trends and patterns in regional inequality and migration.
3.1 Inequality and related data
We use national and provincial level data that are reported in the China Statistical Yearbook. This
annual publication is compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of China and is published by the
China Statistics Press. In conjunction with these data, we also use CEIC Data's \China Premium
Database" because it provides time series of the data in the China Statistical Yearbook. Using these
sources, we construct an annual data sample with a time range of 1993 to 2006, covering a period of
fast economic growth in China. Due to data limitations, not all series have coverage for the entire
period.
To measure income we use the average wage data. It is not reported separately for rural and
urban households, however, the detailed description of the series (see Table A.1) suggests that most
5See \Recent Chinese Hukou Reforms" published by the Congressional Executive Commission on China, accessed
at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/Residency/hreform.php in October 2007.
6of the input into average wage comes from the urban wages.
Unlike most countries, China provides province by province consumer price index (CPI) data.
We take advantage of this fact to calculate real wages using individual province CPI, which allows
us to account for dierences in cost of living in dierent provinces. Figure 1, which depicts the
standard deviation of average wages across provinces as a measure of inequality, shows that because
cost of living is higher in the provinces with higher average wage, part of measured inequality in
average wage disappears once we account for the cost of living. For example, in 2006 the standard
deviation of nominal wage across provinces was 31.3, while the standard deviation of real wage was
23.7. Because real wage inequality and not nominal wage inequality is economically important, we
conduct our analysis in terms of average real wage.
In the appendix, Table A.1 provides denitions and Table A.2 gives summary statistics for the
variables we use in this paper. Because of the high level of economic growth in China, the variables
are trending for all the provinces; thus, for measures of inequality, we express the majority of our
variables in terms of percentage deviation from the country average. In doing so, we obtain unit-
free, common trend-free, comparable variables for all the provinces. The variables that are not
expressed in percentage deviation are CPI, berth capacity, inter-provincial migration, and rural-to-
urban intraprovincial migration.
In 1997, the city of Chongqing in Sichuan province was raised to the status of provincial city,
resulting in creation of a new province and also aecting all the population-based statistics for
the Sichuan province. Moreover, since Chongqing was the largest and wealthiest part of Sichuan,
average income in the Sichuan province was also aected through a composition change. We take
two approaches to dealing with Chongqing: we either drop Sichuan and Chongqing from our sample,
or we construct weighted averages of variables for Chongqing and Sichuan after 1997. Measures of
inequality are weighted by population except for CPI, which is weighted by GDP. In the rest of the
paper, we present the results which treat Chongqing and Sichuan as a combined province, but our
results do not change if we exclude both of them.
We omit the provinces of Hubei and Tibet from our data sample. We omit Hubei because of the
vast relocation of residents there for construction of the Three Gorges dam beginning in December
71994. We do not include Tibet because of a lack of a CPI index that extends back to 1993. Thus,
we cannot construct real measures of key variables that are used in our analysis. With the omission
of Hubei and Tibet, and the combination of Chongqing and Sichuan into a single province, we have
a data set with a total of 28 provinces.
3.2 Migration data
We use migration data that is collected by the National Bureau of Statistics of China and compiled
by China Data Online. The data we use come from the 2000 population census, which measures
migration between November 1, 1995 and November 1, 2000. To our advantage, the data provide
information not only on the province of origin and destination, but also the area within each province
that the migrant came from and went to. This is especially useful to track patterns of migration
such as the movement of people from rural to urban areas|both intra- and interprovincially.6
In the census, individuals ve years of age or older were asked if, on November 1, 2000, they
resided in a dierent subcounty-level unit than that in which they lived on November 1, 1995. If an
individual moved his hukou to the new location or he resided in the new location for more than six
months, he was counted as a migrant. While the migration data includes in-migration to Chinese
provinces from Hong Kong, Macau, and abroad, we exclude these numbers from our analysis.
3.3 Patterns in interprovince migration
We now describe trends in the migration patterns in China. We focus on the migration that took
place between 1995 and 2000, using information from the 2000 population census. Overall, there
were 124.6 million migrants, approximately 9.9 percent of the total Chinese population in 2000. Of
these, 91.8 million were intraprovincial migrants.
In our data, we have emigration (out-migration) from each province broken down into rural
and urban migrants. The urban migrants are those coming from the subcounty-level units of
neighborhood committee of the town and street. The rural migrants are the migrating population
from townships and village committees of the town. With respect to immigration (in-migration),
6See Fan (2005) and Lavely (2001) for a detailed discussion of 2000 migration data.
8we are able to classify migrants as entering a town, city, or county. We broadly dene city and
town as an urban region and county as a rural region.7 Given the structure of the data, we are
able to observe various patterns in migration patterns.
A large part of migration took place within provinces, with population moving from rural to
urban areas. Of the intra-province migrating population, 35 percent moved from rural to urban
areas during this time period.8 Inter{province migration was also important, with 76 percent of all
inter{provincial migrants going into urban areas and almost none going to rural areas.
Table A.3. reports migration for all provinces between 1995 and 2000, both cross-province and
rural-to-urban migration within the province, in levels and as a percent of host province population
in 1997. Not surprisingly, the provincial cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin attracted the
most cross-province migrants as a share of their population. We also note that coastal provinces
tended to attract more cross-province migrants as a share of their population than inland provinces.
Trends in intraprovincial migration are more dicult to identify. The variance in rural-to-urban
intraprovince migration across provinces is much smaller than that of the cross-province migration.
4 What explains persistent interprovince inequality in China?
In this section, we address two sets of explanations for persistent interprovince inequality discussed
in the introduction. We begin by studying osetting factors such as the quality of labor, industry
composition, government transfers, and geographical factors. We then turn to the analysis of cross-
province migration patterns and test whether interprovince migration is driven, at least in part, by
wage dierences and whether this migration, in turn, helps oset some of these dierences.
4.1 Osetting factors
In this section, we look for reasons inequality may be persistent. We refer to them as \osetting
factors," although some of them in fact reect imperfect measurement of remuneration for human
7Chan and Hu (2003) include an appendix of major points in dening urban population for the 2000 census. In
this appendix they state that the urban population of China consists of city and town population.
8Some of these numbers do not reect actual moving of the population but the annex of rural areas by cities. For
statistical purposes, however, this is identical to actual migration.
9capital. We begin with one such measure, education level. Since we do not have a direct measure
of labor quality, we use two dierent measures of education levels in the province to proxy for the
quality of labor. If observed dierences in wages are fully explained by dierences in labor quality,
there is no reason to believe that such dierences should go away. We then consider industry
composition in the provinces. Because labor productivity may be higher in some industries, industry
composition will aect the average wage in the province. While we would expect labor to move
to the industries that are more productive, structural changes in the economy take a long time to
complete and thus inequality that is caused by industry composition is expected to be persistent.
Finally, we test whether some of the wage dierentials across provinces are oset by transfers from
the central government.
Results are reported in Table 1.9 The rst two columns present our results with respect to
measures of education level in each province. Column (1) uses as a proxy the number of college
graduates per capita, while column (2) uses government expenditures on education (in real terms)
per capita. We can see that both measures indicate that, indeed, higher levels of education are
associated with higher average real wages. We can also see that the rst measure explains 16.4
percent of standard deviation in real wages across provinces in 2006, while the second measure
explains 54.4 percent,10 although there could be some spurious correlation in the case of government
expenses on education | provinces that are wealthy for whatever reason are likely to have higher
wages and more expenditures on education. For this reason, and because of sample limitation in the
case of the second measure, we use the rst measure as a control variable in the tests that follow.
Moreover, the rst measure seems to be more relevant, because it measures the contemporaneous
level of college education in the province.
Columns (3) through (6) of Table 1 use dierent measures of industrial composition | em-
ployment shares of primary, secondary, and tertiary industries, which correspond, respectively to
mining and agriculture, manufacturing, and services. We nd that all these measures explain some
of the dierence in real wages across provinces, with higher share of primary industry associated
9Because our right-hand side variables are highly correlated, we include them one at a time. See Table A.4. in
the appendix for the correlation matrix.
10Note the sample dierence between the two columns. They are due to the fact that education expenditure data
are only available starting in 1999.
10with lower average wage, while shares of secondary and tertiary industries (included one by one or
together), are associated with higher average wage. Share of primary industries explains 53.5% of
standard deviation in average real wage across provinces in 2006. We nd these results intuitive,
as manufacturing, and especially services, tend to employ more skilled labor and therefore have
higher wages.
Column (7) shows the eect of the share of agricultural population in a province on its average
wage. We nd that real wage is lower in provinces with higher share of agricultural population.
This eect reects two factors | rst is simply the fact that share of agricultural population is
highly correlated with the share of primary industry; second is that in provinces with higher share
of agricultural population there is more unskilled labor available and therefore there is likely to be
downward pressure on unskilled wages and therefore on average wages.11 This variable explains
35.4% of standard deviation in real wages across provinces.
In column (8) we include the berth capacity of the ports in the province, to proxy for access to
export markets.12 Export industries tend to be more advanced technologically and are therefore
likely to pay higher wages. We nd that, indeed, higher berth capacity is associated with higher
average real wage and explains 22.8% of standard deviation in average real wage across provinces
in 2006.
Finally, column (9) of Table 1 uses the level of transfers from the central government to provinces,
per capita, to test whether some of the wage dierences are oset by government transfers across
provinces. We nd that, contrary to our expectations, the larger transfers go to the states with
higher average real wages. Thus, government transfers, at least in the way we measure them, are
not an osetting factor during our sample period.
11Indeed, as we can see from tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix, higher share of agricultural population is
associated with larger rural-to-urban migration.
12Our preliminary tests demonstrated that it is access to port rather than simply being on the coast that makes a
dierence (Candelaria, Daly, and Hale, 2009).
114.2 Labor mobility
Before addressing the question of whether cross-province migration osets some of the wage dif-
ferences, we have to establish that cross-province migration is driven at least in part by wage
dierences. To this end, we test whether cross-province migration into urban areas between 1995
and 2000 is correlated with dierences in real wages across provinces in 1995 (Table 2) and, al-
ternatively, with dierences in real wages in 1990 and dierences in the growth rate of real wages
between 1990 and 1995 (Table 3). In such a setup, migration does not aect wage dierences.13 We
nd that both the level and the growth rate of real wages have positive eects on migration into
urban areas of a given province from other provinces.14 These results hold even when we control
for the osetting factors that we found to be important in the rst part of our analysis.
Coecients on osetting factors have expected signs | higher education and larger share of
tertiary industries attract more migrants, while a higher share of agricultural population and higher
share of primary industries lower the inow of migrants. Interestingly, the share of secondary
industries, while associated with higher wages (see Table 1), has a negative eect on migration,
while tertiary industries seem to attract migrants. Berth capacity does not enter signicantly in
these regressions.
Having established that migration is indeed driven by wage dierences, we now turn to the main
question of interest | Does migration oset any of the wage dierences? To this end, we estimate
the eect of cross-province migration into urban areas between 1995 and 2000 on real wages in
2001, while controlling for our osetting factors in 2001. The results are reported in Table 4.15
In column (1) we see that, far from osetting wage dierences, higher migration is associated
with higher real wages. This eect is spurious, however. Because real wage dierences across
provinces are highly persistent over time, migration in 1995-2000 may be endogenous even with
respect to 2001 real wages. To rule out this possibility, in column (2) we add the real wage in 1995
as an additional control variable. Once this control is included, migration no longer has a positive
13An important caveat is that, because of the cross-section nature of the migration data, we are down to 28
observations and a cross-province regression.
14For comparison, Tables A.5 and A.6 provide the same analysis for rural-to-urban migration within provinces.
15For comparison, results of similar tests for rural-to-urban migration within provinces are reported in Table A.7.
12eect on real wages. In fact, we nd a negative eect in some specications, which would indicate
that there is some equalizing eect of migration, although this negative eect is never statistically
signicant and the reduction in the variance of the residual is minimal to nil (comparing column
(2) with column (11)). We conclude, therefore, that the cross-province migration that occurred
between 1995 and 2000 did not produce any equalizing eects.
5 Conclusion
Provincial statistics show that regional inequality in China has been persistent and even growing
in the past two decades. We nd that the main sources of this growth were structural and long-
term factors such as labor quality, industrial composition, and geographical location. We nd
that interprovincial transfers did not oset wage inequality during our sample period, nor did
interprovince migration. These ndings suggest that regional income inequality in China is not
likely to go away in the near future.
While we believe that fully removing barriers to labor mobility will help reduce cross-province
wage inequality, we are aware that urban infrastructure is unable to accommodate large inows of
new migrants. We therefore view the message of this paper as more positive than normative |
given the gradual nature of structural changes and urban infrastructure development, we should
expect regional inequality in China to persist for quite some time.
A policy implication of this observation is that social tensions that arise from such inequality
may need to be addressed in the short run through redistribution. According to our analysis of the
measures we considered, such redistribution has not been present during our sample period . The
Chinese government, however, recognizes inequality as an important problem, which is reected in
its most recent ve{year plan.
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Table A.1: Variable Denitions
nominal wage Average annual wage in yuan per person for sta and workers in enterprises,
institutions, and government agencies, which reects the general level of wage income.
cpi Consumer price index; 1988 = 100.
real wage Average annual wage in yuan per person for sta and workers in enterprises, institu-
tions, and government agencies deated by the consumer price index (1988 = 100).
educ college Number of college graduates of regular institutions of higher learning scaled by
population.
educ spending Expenditure of provincial government on education scaled by population.
share primary Share of employees involved in the production of raw goods (primary sector).
share secondary Share of employees involved in the manufacture of goods (secondary sector).
share tertiary Share of employees in the services sector (tertiary sector).
share ag pop Share of agricultural population.
berth capacity Number of berths in major coastal ports (10,000 ton class, end of year 2000).
govt transfer National government subsidy to provincial government per capita.
xp migration Number of migrants moving into an urban area of a province from an urban or
rural area in another province. This variable is scaled by population in 1997 in the destination
province (in basis points).
ru migration Number of migrants moving into an urban area of a given province from a rural
area in that province. This variable is scaled by the population in 1997 in the province (in
basis points).
21Table A.2: Summary Statistics
Name 1st year data Mean (level) Std. Dev.(level) Mean (PD) Std. Dev (PD)
nominal wage 1993 10491.9 6483.7 1.95 30.3
cpi 1993 249.7 37.1 { {
real wage 1993 3950.4 2005.6 -5.93 22.7
educ college 1993 0.001 .001 18.5 99.9
educ spending 1999 77.1 52.9 12.5 56.0
share primary 1993 0.49 0.16 -0.67 32.1
share secondary 1993 0.22 0.10 -4.1 43.8
share tertiary 1993 0.29 0.08 4.7 28.1
share ag pop 1997 0.68 0.16 -5.3 22.0
berth capacity 1993 12.8 22.2 { {
govt transfer 1999 303.6 177.5 21.9 60.3
xp migration 1993 0.26 0.36 { {
ru migration 1993 0.24 0.10 { {
See Table A.1. for variable denitions.
PD is percent deviation from country average in each year.
22Table A.3: Migration Statistics: Cross-Province and Intraprovince
Cross-Province Intraprovince
In{migration to urban area In{migration to urban area from rural area
Gross number Share province pop Gross Number Share province pop
(thousands) (basis points) (thousands) (basis points)
Anhui 174 .028 1143 .19
Beijing 1592 1.3 227 .18
Chongqing/Sichuan 448 .039 3031 .26
Fujian 905 .28 1413 .43
Gansu 182 .073 468 .19
Guangdong 8534 1.2 3863 .55
Guangxi 236 .051 1116 .24
Guizhou 202 .056 681 .19
Hainan 183 .25 191 .26
Hebei 497 .076 1415 .22
Heilongjiang 238 .063 613 .16
Henan 326 .035 1576 .17
Hunan 273 .042 1429 .22
Inner Mongolia 228 .098 797 .34
Jiangsu 1265 .18 2168 .3
Jiangxi 163 .039 922 .22
Jilin 206 .079 413 .16
Liaoning 600 .14 742 .18
Ningxia 76 .14 141 .27
Qinghai 70 .14 90 .18
Shaanxi 366 .1 714 .2
Shandong 667 .076 2860 .33
Shanghai 1947 1.3 344 .24
Shanxi 225 .072 734 .23
Tianjin 442 .46 148 .16
Xinjiang 551 .32 324 .19
Yunnan 627 .15 1042 .25
Zhejiang 1892 .43 2236 .5
23T
a
b
l
e
A
.
4
:
C
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
m
a
t
r
i
x
f
o
r
o

s
e
t
t
i
n
g
f
a
c
t
o
r
s
.
N
o
b
s
.
=
2
2
4
e
d
u
c
c
o
l
l
e
g
e
e
d
u
c
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
s
h
a
r
e
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
s
h
a
r
e
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
s
h
a
r
e
t
e
r
t
i
a
r
y
s
h
a
r
e
a
g
p
o
p
b
e
r
t
h
c
a
p
a
c
i
t
y
e
d
u
c
c
o
l
l
e
g
e
1
.
0
0
0
.
8
1
-
0
.
8
2
0
.
6
3
0
.
8
5
-
0
.
8
1
0
.
3
5
e
d
u
c
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
0
.
8
1
1
.
0
0
-
0
.
8
6
0
.
7
1
0
.
8
0
-
0
.
8
6
0
.
5
6
s
h
a
r
e
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
-
0
.
8
2
-
0
.
8
6
1
.
0
0
-
0
.
8
8
-
0
.
8
6
0
.
8
3
-
0
.
5
9
s
h
a
r
e
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
0
.
6
3
0
.
7
1
-
0
.
8
8
1
.
0
0
0
.
5
3
-
0
.
6
2
0
.
6
7
s
h
a
r
e
t
e
r
t
i
a
r
y
0
.
8
5
0
.
8
0
-
0
.
8
6
0
.
5
3
1
.
0
0
-
0
.
8
4
0
.
3
5
s
h
a
r
e
a
g
p
o
p
-
0
.
8
1
-
0
.
8
6
0
.
8
3
-
0
.
6
2
-
0
.
8
4
1
.
0
0
-
0
.
5
3
b
e
r
t
h
c
a
p
a
c
i
t
y
0
.
3
5
0
.
5
6
-
0
.
5
9
0
.
6
7
0
.
3
5
-
0
.
5
3
1
.
0
0
24T
a
b
l
e
A
.
5
:
I
s
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
e
x
p
l
a
i
n
e
d
b
y
i
n
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
?
I
n
t
r
a
p
r
o
v
i
n
c
i
a
l
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
(
9
)
r
e
a
l
w
a
g
e
9
5
2
.
6
1
*
*
*
4
.
3
0
*
*
*
4
.
0
4
*
*
*
4
.
2
5
*
*
*
4
.
3
3
*
*
*
3
.
9
6
*
*
*
4
.
3
4
*
*
*
4
.
0
7
*
*
*
2
.
8
3
*
*
(
0
.
8
3
)
(
0
.
7
2
)
(
0
.
7
5
)
(
0
.
9
7
)
(
0
.
9
9
)
(
0
.
8
4
)
(
0
.
7
3
)
(
0
.
8
2
)
(
1
.
1
1
)
e
d
u
c
c
o
l
l
e
g
e
9
5
-
0
.
5
8
*
*
*
-
0
.
7
5
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
4
*
-
0
.
6
9
*
*
*
(
0
.
1
3
)
(
0
.
2
3
)
(
0
.
2
3
)
(
0
.
2
1
)
s
h
a
r
e
a
g
p
o
p
9
7
2
.
9
4
*
*
*
0
.
9
2
(
0
.
7
4
)
(
1
.
2
8
)
s
h
a
r
e
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
9
5
1
.
6
0
*
*
-
0
.
5
1
(
0
.
6
0
)
(
0
.
8
1
)
s
h
a
r
e
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
9
5
-
0
.
4
6
0
.
0
0
5
2
(
0
.
5
3
)
(
0
.
4
6
)
s
h
a
r
e
t
e
r
t
i
a
r
y
9
5
-
1
.
2
3
0
.
9
3
(
0
.
9
0
)
(
1
.
0
0
)
b
e
r
t
h
c
a
p
a
c
i
t
y
-
0
.
3
0
(
0
.
9
8
)
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
2
6
6
.
6
*
*
*
2
9
2
.
9
*
*
*
2
9
3
.
7
*
*
*
2
8
4
.
2
*
*
*
2
8
5
.
0
*
*
*
2
9
1
.
6
*
*
*
2
9
5
.
0
*
*
*
2
9
1
.
8
*
*
*
2
7
1
.
9
*
*
*
(
1
7
.
2
)
(
1
4
.
1
)
(
1
5
.
3
)
(
1
6
.
8
)
(
1
7
.
1
)
(
1
4
.
5
)
(
1
4
.
6
)
(
1
4
.
4
)
(
2
4
.
7
)
A
d
j
.
R
2
0
.
2
5
0
.
5
8
0
.
5
2
0
.
3
9
0
.
3
7
0
.
5
6
0
.
5
7
0
.
5
7
0
.
2
2
N
o
b
s
.
2
8
2
8
2
8
2
8
2
8
2
8
2
8
2
8
2
8
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
R
u
r
a
l
t
o
U
r
b
a
n
I
n
t
r
a
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
N
o
b
s
.
:
2
8
O
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
.
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
S
i
g
n
i

c
a
n
c
e
l
e
v
e
l
s
:
*
*
*
1
%
;
*
*
5
%
;
*
1
0
%
.
25T
a
b
l
e
A
.
6
:
I
s
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
e
x
p
l
a
i
n
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
g
r
o
w
t
h
i
n
i
n
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
?
I
n
t
r
a
p
r
o
v
i
n
c
i
a
l
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
(
9
)
a
g
r
w
a
g
e
9
0
t
o
9
5
2
6
.
7
*
*
*
3
0
.
0
*
*
*
2
7
.
4
*
*
*
3
3
.
7
*
*
*
3
3
.
9
*
*
*
2
8
.
0
*
*
*
2
9
.
8
*
*
*
2
8
.
9
*
*
*
2
7
.
0
*
*
*
(
8
.
2
5
)
(
6
.
4
6
)
(
6
.
9
3
)
(
7
.
8
9
)
(
8
.
0
4
)
(
7
.
3
2
)
(
6
.
6
4
)
(
7
.
1
4
)
(
8
.
9
3
)
r
e
a
l
w
a
g
e
9
0
0
.
7
6
2
.
7
5
*
*
2
.
5
9
*
*
2
.
3
0
*
2
.
3
6
*
2
.
6
1
*
*
2
.
8
1
*
*
2
.
6
6
*
*
0
.
8
5
(
1
.
1
7
)
(
1
.
0
2
)
(
1
.
1
2
)
(
1
.
2
0
)
(
1
.
2
3
)
(
1
.
0
8
)
(
1
.
0
6
)
(
1
.
0
6
)
(
1
.
3
8
)
e
d
u
c
c
o
l
l
e
g
e
9
5
-
0
.
5
3
*
*
*
-
0
.
6
7
*
*
*
-
0
.
4
7
*
-
0
.
6
0
*
*
*
(
0
.
1
3
)
(
0
.
2
4
)
(
0
.
2
4
)
(
0
.
2
1
)
s
h
a
r
e
a
g
p
o
p
9
7
2
.
5
8
*
*
*
0
.
4
0
(
0
.
7
6
)
(
1
.
3
0
)
s
h
a
r
e
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
9
5
1
.
5
1
*
*
-
0
.
3
4
(
0
.
5
7
)
(
0
.
8
2
)
s
h
a
r
e
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
9
5
-
0
.
4
6
-
0
.
0
5
1
(
0
.
5
1
)
(
0
.
4
7
)
s
h
a
r
e
t
e
r
t
i
a
r
y
9
5
-
1
.
0
9
0
.
8
1
(
0
.
8
7
)
(
1
.
0
1
)
b
e
r
t
h
c
a
p
a
c
i
t
y
-
0
.
1
2
(
0
.
9
3
)
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
1
1
1
.
8
*
*
1
0
6
.
2
*
*
*
1
2
1
.
5
*
*
*
8
0
.
3
*
7
9
.
4
*
1
1
7
.
6
*
*
*
1
0
8
.
4
*
*
*
1
1
2
.
7
*
*
*
1
1
1
.
3
*
*
(
4
4
.
9
)
(
3
4
.
9
)
(
3
7
.
8
)
(
4
2
.
1
)
(
4
2
.
9
)
(
3
9
.
8
)
(
3
6
.
2
)
(
3
8
.
7
)
(
4
5
.
9
)
A
d
j
.
R
2
0
.
3
1
0
.
5
8
0
.
5
1
0
.
4
4
0
.
4
2
0
.
5
6
0
.
5
7
0
.
5
7
0
.
2
8
N
o
b
s
.
2
8
2
8
2
8
2
8
2
8
2
8
2
8
2
8
2
8
D
e
p
.
V
a
r
.
:
R
u
r
a
l
t
o
U
r
b
a
n
I
n
t
r
a
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
N
o
b
s
.
:
2
8
O
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
.
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
S
i
g
n
i

c
a
n
c
e
l
e
v
e
l
s
:
*
*
*
1
%
;
*
*
5
%
;
*
1
0
%
.
26T
a
b
l
e
A
.
7
:
D
o
e
s
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
r
e
d
u
c
e
i
n
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
?
I
n
t
r
a
p
r
o
v
i
n
c
i
a
l
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
(
7
)
(
8
)
(
9
)
(
1
0
)
r
u
m
i
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
0
.
1
3
*
*
*
0
.
0
1
3
0
.
0
3
6
0
.
0
4
5
*
*
0
.
0
3
0
0
.
0
2
2
0
.
0
2
6
0
.
0
2
6
0
.
0
4
1
*
0
.
0
1
3
(
0
.
0
4
2
)
(
0
.
0
1
8
)
(
0
.
0
2
3
)
(
0
.
0
1
9
)
(
0
.
0
1
9
)
(
0
.
0
1
7
)
(
0
.
0
2
0
)
(
0
.
0
1
9
)
(
0
.
0
2
2
)
(
0
.
0
1
9
)
r
e
a
l
w
a
g
e
9
5
1
.
1
5
*
*
*
1
.
0
0
*
*
*
0
.
7
5
*
*
*
0
.
9
4
*
*
*
0
.
9
5
*
*
*
1
.
0
4
*
*
*
0
.
9
3
*
*
*
0
.
9
7
*
*
*
1
.
1
2
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
9
2
)
(
0
.
1
3
)
(
0
.
1
5
)
(
0
.
1
3
)
(
0
.
1
2
)
(
0
.
1
2
)
(
0
.
1
3
)
(
0
.
1
2
)
(
0
.
1
2
)
e
d
u
c
c
o
l
l
e
g
e
0
1
0
.
0
3
9
(
0
.
0
2
4
)
e
d
u
c
s
p
e
n
d
i
n
g
0
1
0
.
1
5
*
*
*
(
0
.
0
4
6
)
s
h
a
r
e
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
0
1
-
0
.
1
7
*
*
(
0
.
0
7
3
)
s
h
a
r
e
s
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
0
1
0
.
1
2
*
*
0
.
1
1
*
(
0
.
0
5
2
)
(
0
.
0
5
9
)
s
h
a
r
e
t
e
r
t
i
a
r
y
0
1
0
.
1
0
0
.
0
4
1
(
0
.
0
7
5
)
(
0
.
0
7
9
)
s
h
a
r
e
a
g
p
o
p
0
1
-
0
.
2
1
*
*
(
0
.
0
9
9
)
b
e
r
t
h
0
.
0
4
5
(
0
.
0
9
2
)
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
-
3
9
.
1
*
*
*
-
1
.
4
6
-
9
.
1
0
-
1
4
.
0
*
*
-
7
.
1
7
-
4
.
0
0
-
6
.
2
1
-
5
.
6
2
-
1
1
.
1
-
2
.
4
2
A
d
j
.
R
2
0
.
2
6
0
.
9
0
0
.
9
0
0
.
9
2
0
.
9
1
0
.
9
1
0
.
9
0
0
.
9
1
0
.
9
1
0
.
8
9
S
.
D
.
o
f
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
2
1
.
3
7
.
8
4
7
.
4
4
6
.
5
5
7
.
1
0
7
.
0
6
7
.
5
4
7
.
0
2
7
.
1
7
7
.
8
0
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
R
e
a
l
W
a
g
e
P
D
.
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
p
r
o
v
i
n
c
e
s
:
2
8
;
S
.
D
.
o
f
r
e
a
l
w
a
g
e
:
2
5
.
2
(
2
0
0
1
)
;
O
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
.
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
i
n
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
s
.
S
i
g
n
i

c
a
n
c
e
l
e
v
e
l
s
:
*
*
*
1
%
;
*
*
5
%
;
*
1
0
%
.
27